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1 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
The Internet Association represents roughly forty leading technology 
companies. Its membership includes a broad range of Internet platforms, from 
travel sites and online marketplaces to social networking services and search 
engines.  The Internet Association advances public policy solutions that strengthen 
and protect Internet freedoms, foster innovation and economic growth, and 
empower small businesses and the public.  It respectfully submits this Brief of 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party to encourage this Court to appropriately 
limit its decision to the unique facts of this case so that its decision does not reach 
further than necessary or unintentionally disrupt the modern, innovative Internet. 
 
                                           
1 In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), 
amicus certifies that (1) this brief was authored entirely by counsel for amicus 
curiae and not by counsel for any party, in whole or part; (2) no party or counsel 
for any party contributed money to fund preparing or submitting this brief; and (3) 
apart from amicus curiae, its members, and its counsel, no other person contributed 
money to fund preparing or submitting this brief.   
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case presents an exceedingly narrow legal question:  whether certain 
portions of a specific Twitter account are public forums for purposes of the First 
Amendment.  In particular, it involves a Twitter account that a public official, the 
President of the United States, has used “as a channel for communicating and 
interacting with the public about his administration.”  Stipulation at ¶ 32, Knight 
First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, No. 17-5205 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017), ECF No. 30-1 (“Stipulation”).  The case considers 
whether that public official may, consistent with the First Amendment, “block” 
other users’ ability to “repost or respond to [his] messages, and to interact with 
other Twitter users in relation to those messages.”  Id. ¶ 13.  To make this 
determination, this Court must consider whether the so-called “interactive spaces” 
associated with President Trump’s Twitter account—i.e., the spaces “for replies 
and retweets created by each tweet sent by the @realDonaldTrump account,” 
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 
3d 541, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)—are public forums.   
The Internet Association takes no position as to whether President Trump’s 
Twitter account is indeed a public forum or whether he violated the First 
Amendment by blocking certain users from replying to or re-tweeting his 
messages.  The Internet Association does, however, respectfully submit that this 
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Court should carefully, consciously, and conspicuously limit its decision to these 
unique facts.  In so doing, this Court should emphasize three points to prevent any 
confusion about the rights and legal responsibilities of Internet platforms, account-
holders, and other users.   
First, this Court should make clear that this case does not implicate the 
overwhelming majority of social media accounts throughout the Internet.  In fact, it 
does not implicate the overwhelming majority of Twitter accounts and “interactive 
spaces” located throughout Twitter.  “Twitter is a social media platform with more 
than 300 million active users worldwide, including some 70 million in the United 
States.”  Stipulation at ¶ 13.  But only an extremely small number of those 70 
million American users are public officials or government entities.  Critically, 
Twitter accounts held by public officials or governmental entities are differently 
situated than other accounts.  Unlike President Trump’s Twitter account, there can 
be no serious argument that a non-public official’s account is owned or controlled 
by the government—a key prerequisite for establishing a public forum.  Thus, even 
if this Court were to conclude that the “interactive space” connected to a public 
official’s Twitter account may be a public forum in certain circumstances, that 
holding would not apply to the tens of millions of other active Twitter accounts.   
 Second, despite this crucial difference between President Trump’s Twitter 
account and the accounts of non-public officials, they do share one thing in 
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common:  all Twitter accounts are subject to Twitter’s Terms of Service.  Twitter 
is the owner and controller of the “property” that might constitute a public forum 
here.  Despite any First Amendment status that this Court might find in the 
“interactive spaces” associated with President Trump’s account, Twitter retains 
authority to revoke access to both his account and the account of any user seeking 
to comment on President Trump’s account.  Twitter similarly retains authority to 
remove any content in that “interactive space.”  Although the district court 
acknowledged this in passing—“Twitter also maintains control over the 
@realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter accounts),” Knight First 
Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 567—this Court should expressly 
acknowledge this essential fact to avoid subsequent confusion in this ever-
developing area of law.      
 Third, Twitter is not a state actor for the purpose of the First Amendment.  It 
is “elementary constitutional doctrine that the first amendment only restrains action 
undertaken by the Government.”  Buckley v. American Fed’n of Television and 
Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 1974).  But Twitter is not the 
Government.  Because this case involves only a miniscule proportion of Twitter’s 
more than 300 million users, and because Twitter itself is the ultimate owner of all 
of the space on its platform, there is a considerable risk that any decision that may 
recognize isolated public forums on Twitter will be misunderstood to hold that 
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Twitter, too, can be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.  This Court should bear 
in mind that, despite the idiosyncratic facts of this case, Twitter itself is not a state 
actor when it blocks or withdraws access to its account-holders or users, and it is 
therefore not subject to the First Amendment’s restraints.       
 At bottom, the Internet Association advocates simply that “[i]n considering 
the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving 
technology, this Court should proceed with caution.”  Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).  More than two 
decades ago, a plurality of the Supreme Court similarly cautioned that it was “not 
at all clear that the public forum doctrine should be imported wholesale” into a 
“new and changing area”—then, the innovative area of cable television.  Denver 
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996).  Now 
faced with another cutting-edge technology, this Court should be equally cautious 
when making decisions at the crossroads of private property and an asserted public 
forum.  Here, that cautious approach counsels in favor of ensuring that any 
decision is expressly limited to the exceptional facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VAST MAJORITY OF TWITTER ACCOUNTS CANNOT BE 
DEEMED PUBLIC FORUMS. 
If this Court concludes that appellees have Article III standing to raise their 
First Amendment claims, a central question in this appeal is whether the 
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“interactive spaces” connected to President Trump’s Twitter account are public 
forums.  “Because facilities or locations deemed to be public forums are usually 
operated by governments, determining that a particular facility or location is a 
public forum usually suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state 
action subject to First Amendment limitations.”  Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. 
Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2018).  Here, however, the asserted 
public forum is not owned by the government.  It is a small piece of cyberspace on 
a platform owned and controlled by Twitter that is associated with an account 
operated by a public official.  This unique scenario raises the question whether 
those particular “interactive spaces” “have a sufficient connection to governmental 
authority to be deemed” public forums.  Id. at 307.   
Public forum analysis typically applies only to spaces that are owned and 
therefore controlled by the government.  E.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the 
Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) 
(“[I]n a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine 
when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place 
limitations on speech.” (emphasis added)); West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic 
Comm’n of State of Conn., 951 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[P]ublic forum 
analysis applies only where a private party seeks access to public property, such as 
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a park, a street corner, or school auditorium, in order to communicate ideas to 
others.”).   
But in rare occasions, courts have applied the public forum doctrine to 
property the government temporarily controls, but does not own.  In Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court 
applied the public forum analysis to real property that was temporarily under 
government control, holding that a “privately owned . . . theater under long-term 
lease to the city” was a public forum for First Amendment purposes.  Id. at 547, 
552.   
Courts have also applied public forum analysis to privately-owned media 
outlets that are subject to extensive government regulation.  For example, this 
Court recently held that a privately-owned public access television station was a 
public forum.  Halleck, 882 F.3d at 300.  This Court made clear, however, that its 
holding was fact-dependent.  Halleck stated that where  
federal law authorizes setting aside channels for public access to be 
“the electronic marketplace of ideas,” state regulation requires cable 
operators to provide at least one public access channel, a municipal 
contract requires a cable operator to provide four such channels, and a 
municipal official has designated a private corporation to run those 
channels, those channels are public forums. 
 
Id. at 306.  Based on this specific “statutory, regulatory, and contractual 
framework,” this Court concluded that the public access channel at issue was, in 
fact, a public forum.  Id.  The Court declined, however, to “determin[e] whether a 
Case 18-1691, Document 39, 08/14/2018, 2367989, Page14 of 33
  
8 
public access channel is necessarily a public forum simply by virtue of its function 
in providing an equivalent of the public square.”  Id.  
In addition, at least one court (other than the district court below) has held 
that interactive spaces on privately owned websites may constitute a public forum.  
In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. 
Va. 2017), a district court held that a Facebook page belonging to the Chair of the 
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors—the local governing body for Loudoun, 
County, Virginia—was a public forum.  In that case, the record included 100 
examples of the Chair’s Facebook posts, “nearly all of which relate directly or 
indirectly to [her] public office.”  Id. at 714 n.3.  The Court observed that “[t]here 
is comparably little evidence of posts of a more personal nature.”  Id.  In addition, 
the Court explained that the Chair had “affirmatively solicited comments from her 
constituents” on issues of public importance.  Id. at 716.  Based on these facts, the 
Court concluded that the public official had opened up her Facebook page as a 
public forum. 
 This Court will no doubt wrestle with these same considerations as it 
evaluates whether President Trump’s Twitter account qualifies as a public forum.  
Again, the Internet Association takes no position on that question.  But no matter 
how this Court decides that issue in the narrow context of President Trump’s 
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account, it can—and should—easily conclude that the vast majority of Twitter 
accounts are not public forums.   
Most straightforwardly, tens of millions of Twitter accounts are not operated 
by government entities or public officials.  That fact alone demonstrates that 
virtually all of the space on Twitter cannot be deemed a public forum (and 
therefore will not be controlled by the Court’s decision in this case).  See generally 
Gov’t Opening Br. at 32  (“To the extent that Twitter provides the means for 
conversations among its many users, Twitter as a whole could be characterized as a 
private forum for public expression—though not a ‘public forum’ in the First 
Amendment sense, given its non-governmental character.”).    
 President Trump’s history with Twitter provides a perfect illustration.  
President Trump first opened his Twitter account in 2009 when he was a private 
citizen.  For years, Citizen Trump used that account to offer his opinions “about a 
variety of topics, including popular culture and politics.”  Stipulation ¶ 32.  There 
is no debate in this case that had President Trump remained Citizen Trump, his 
private Twitter account—and the “interactive spaces” connected to it—could not 
be a public forum.  The narrow question before this Court is whether that Twitter 
account became a public forum when President Trump took office and began using 
it for governmental purposes.   
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Even if public officials have and use Twitter accounts, moreover, they may 
not use those accounts for government business, in which case there would be no 
basis for finding that the account was controlled by the government.  Here, the 
district court found it significant that “President Trump sometimes uses the account 
to announce matters related to official government business before those matters 
are announced to the public through other official channels,”2 and that “[t]he 
National Archives and Records Administration has advised the White House that 
the President’s tweets from @realDonaldTrump . . . are official records that must 
be preserved under the Presidential Records Act.”  Knight First Amendment 
Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 553 (citing Stipulation ¶¶ 38, 40).  Likewise, the court 
in Davison emphasized that the public official used her Facebook account to make 
statements about public affairs and to invite comments from constituents.  See 267 
F. Supp. 3d at 716 & n.4.  But very few account-holders are public officials who 
use their Twitter accounts to officially announce government policy about things 
                                           
2 See Stipulation ¶ 38 (stipulating that “President Trump uses 
@realDonaldTrump, often multiple times a day, to announce, describe, and defend 
his policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce 
official decisions; to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; 
to challenge media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he believes 
to be unfair; and for other statements, including on occasion statements unrelated 
to official government business.”). 
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like the ability of transgender individuals to serve in the military,3 sensitive 
diplomatic and national security issues,4 the formal resignation of Cabinet 
Secretaries,5 and other official government actions.   
These facts demonstrate the narrowness of the issue before this Court.  Few 
Twitter accounts are operated by government officials, and even fewer are devoted 
to public use.  When deciding whether President Trump’s account is a public 
forum, this Court should expressly state that its decision does not affect virtually 
all of the other accounts or “interactive spaces” on Twitter (and other Internet 
Association members’ platforms) for which there would be no basis to find 
ownership or control by the government—a prerequisite to any public forum 
analysis.6 
                                           
3 Stipulation ¶ 41 (“For example, on July 26, 2017, President Trump issued a 
series of tweets . . . announcing ‘that the United States Government will not accept 
or allow . . . Transgender individuals to serve . . . .’”). 
4 Stipulation ¶¶ 15, 21. 
5 Knight First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 553 (“Since the 
parties’ stipulation, the President has also used the @realDonaldTrump account in 
removing then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs David Shulkin.”). 
6 Regardless of how it rules, the Court also should affirm the district court’s 
recognition that “the @realDonaldTrump account as a whole” is not “the would-be 
forum.”  Knight First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.  “Plaintiffs do 
not seek access to the account as a whole—they do not desire the ability to send 
tweets as the President, the ability to receive notifications that the President would 
receive, or the ability to decide who the President follows on Twitter.”  Id.  
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II. TWITTER RETAINS CONTROL OVER TWITTER ACCOUNTS 
AND ANY ASSOCIATED “INTERACTIVE SPACES.” 
The district court correctly noted that “Twitter is a private (though publicly 
traded) company that is not government-owned.”  Knight First Amendment 
Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.  It also correctly observed that Twitter “maintains 
control over the @realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter accounts).”  Id. 
at 567.  But the district court did not take these observations to their logical and 
necessary conclusions:  (1) Twitter may remove or “block” a would-be commenter 
in the “interactive space,” even if this Court decides that a public official account-
holder may not do so; and (2) Twitter can suspend or disable that public official’s 
account, thereby eliminating the ability for anyone to participate in its associated 
“interactive space.”  While these conclusions were perhaps implicit in the district 
court’s decision, this Court should make them explicit in its opinion on appeal, 
regardless of how it decides the other questions at issue.     
These conclusions ineluctably flow from the terms of Twitter’s User 
Agreement.  That Agreement unambiguously provides that it “may suspend or 
terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the Services at 
                                           
Plaintiffs challenge only the constitutionality of President Trump’s decision to 
block the individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account, and all they 
seek is a declaration that blocking the individual plaintiffs was unconstitutional and 
an injunction requiring the defendants to unblock the individual plaintiffs.  This 
further demonstrates what a small plot of Twitterspace is at issue here.   
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any time for any or no reason.”  Twitter Terms of Service, at 
https://twitter.com/en/tos (emphasis added).  Likewise, those Terms of Service 
provide that Twitter “reserve[s] the right to remove Content that violates the User 
Agreement, including for example, copyright or trademark violations, 
impersonation, unlawful conduct, or harassment.”  Id.; see Twitter Rules and 
Policies, at https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies#twitter-rules.  Taken 
together, these provisions leave no doubt that any public forums that may exist in 
“interactive spaces” on Twitter’s platform are subject to Twitter’s control.    
Courts have not faced a situation where a private actor with control over its 
property revokes access to a government actor operating a potential public forum 
on that property.  But here, Twitter’s ability to revoke access to a public official’s 
account without violating the First Amendment stems from the kind of public 
forum that may exist on Twitter.   
“The Supreme Court has recognized three types of fora across a spectrum of 
constitutional protection for expressive activity”: traditional public forums, 
designated public forums, and nonpublic forums.  Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. 
Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004).  As the district court rightly held, 
Twitter’s “interactive spaces” cannot be “traditional public forums,” i.e., “places 
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and 
debate, [where] the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply 
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circumscribed.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n , 460 U.S. 37, 
45 (1983); Knight First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (“[W]e can 
first conclude that the interactive space of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is 
not a traditional public forum. There is no historical practice of the interactive 
space of a tweet being used for public speech and debate since time immemorial, 
for there is simply no extended historical practice as to the medium of Twitter.”). 
Consequently, this Court must consider whether, in these unique 
circumstances, Twitter’s interactive spaces are “designated public forums,” 
“nonpublic forums,” or no forum at all.  E.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n 
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1998).  In any of those categories, the 
government itself has the ability to revoke access to the forum or change the nature 
of the forum.  For example, even in “designated public forums,” the Supreme 
Court has recognized that “a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open 
character of” a particular forum.  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.  As a logical 
matter, that is enough for this Court to find that Twitter can revoke a would-be re-
tweeter’s access to a designated public forum (the “interactive space” connected to 
an account)—or the forum itself (the account-holder’s Twitter account itself).  
After all, by agreeing to Twitter’s Terms of Service as a condition of opening an 
account, a public official necessarily agrees that Twitter can extinguish the “open 
character” of the “interactive spaces” associated with her account.  Id.  Thus, 
Case 18-1691, Document 39, 08/14/2018, 2367989, Page21 of 33
  
15 
because “the government may decide to close a designated public forum,” Make 
the Rd. by Walking, 378 F.3d at 143, it also may agree to permit underlying private 
property owners to close that forum.  Nothing in law or logic suggests that the 
government cannot delegate the forum-closing decision to someone else—
particularly when the other entity is the actual owner of the forum’s property.  
Accordingly, even if the Court concludes that elements of the @realDonaldTrump 
account constitute a public forum, nothing about that holding would prevent 
Twitter from continuing to exercise control over that account and access to the 
“interactive spaces” associated with it under the plain terms of its User 
Agreement.7 
                                           
7 The Knight Institute makes a different claim than the private plaintiffs.  It 
does not wish to interact directly with President Trump’s Twitter account.  Instead, 
it wants to “read comments that otherwise would have been posted by the blocked 
Plaintiffs . . . in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets.”  Stipulation ¶ 61.  But 
the Knight Institute would have no First Amendment claim against Twitter if 
Twitter were to disable a public official’s account or otherwise remove content in 
“interactive spaces” associated with that account.  “The right to receive 
information in the free speech context is merely the reciprocal of the right of the 
speaker.”  Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High Sch. Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 
620 (D. Vt. 1979) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976)).  Here, any Twitter account-holder’s 
right to speak (or, as here, reply or re-tweet) is subject to Twitter’s ultimate 
control.  Accordingly, the Knight Institute has no First Amendment right to read 
content on Twitter if Twitter determines that this content should be removed under 
its Terms of Service.  Relatedly, as explained below in Section III, Twitter is not a 
state actor.  As such, the Knight Institute would have no First Amendment claim 
against Twitter. 
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III. TWITTER IS NOT A “STATE ACTOR.” 
The foregoing sections establish two principles:  (1) Twitter is private 
property, operated by private citizens for private purposes, and the overwhelming 
majority of it cannot be deemed a public forum; and (2) Twitter retains ultimate 
control over its platform and thus can freely remove accounts or block content in 
“interactive spaces.”  Given Twitter’s complete control over these communicative 
spaces, it is possible that some will assert that Twitter itself is a “state actor” 
subject to First Amendment constraints.  It is not.  Relatedly, if this Court 
concludes that certain “interactive spaces” on Twitter are public forums, some may 
mistakenly assert that Twitter itself is a state actor for First Amendment purposes 
when it takes action as to content in those public spaces.  It is not.  This Court 
should be especially careful to avoid creating confusion on these important issues.       
The First Amendment’s “guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against 
abridgment by government, federal or state.”  Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 
513 (1976).  To the extent the law “extend[s] protection or provide[s] redress 
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression of 
others” that protection is a product of common law or statute—not the 
Constitution.  Id.; Halleck, 882 F.3d at 304 (“Because [Defendant] is a private 
corporation, the viability of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim against it and its 
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employees depends on whether [Defendant’s] actions can be deemed state 
action.”).8  
A private company like Twitter may be treated as a state actor only:  
(1) [when] the entity acts pursuant to the “coercive power” of the state 
or is “controlled” by the state (“the compulsion test”); (2) when the 
state provides “significant encouragement” to the entity, the entity is a 
“willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate,” or the entity’s 
functions are “entwined” with state policies (“the joint action test” or 
“close nexus test”); or (3) when the entity “has been delegated a 
public function by the [s]tate,” (“the public function test”).   
 
Sybalski v. Independent Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)).  As explained below—and as courts have consistently 
                                           
8 In the ordinary public forum case, there is no need to separately consider 
the application of these rules.  As this Court recently explained, “[b]ecause 
facilities or locations deemed to be public forums are usually operated by 
governments, determining that a particular facility or location is a public forum 
usually suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state action 
subject to First Amendment limitations.”  Halleck, 882 F.3d at 306-07; see Knight 
First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 568 (same); Prager Univ. v. Google 
LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) 
(noting that Supreme Court’s cases considering “private property dedicated to 
public use” had “addressed whether certain speech restrictions enacted by the 
federal government violated the First Amendment” (citation omitted)).  Put 
differently, when a space is a public forum, it generally means that the government 
not only has control over that space, but that it exercises exclusive control.  As 
explained above, however, that is not true here because Twitter retains control over 
all spaces on its platform under the terms of its User Agreement. 
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concluded9—private social media companies’ operation and regulation of their 
own platforms do not satisfy any of these tests.  Such companies are, therefore, not 
state actors and their activities do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny, even if a 
court were to find that certain “interactive spaces” on Twitter qualify as public 
forums, and even when Twitter takes action as to the content in those spaces. 
                                           
9 See, e.g., Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (holding that YouTube 
and Google were not “state actors that must regulate the content on their privately 
created website in accordance with the strictures of the First Amendment”); 
Nyabwa v. FaceBook, No. 2:17-CV-24, 2018 WL 585467, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 
2018) (“Because the First Amendment governs only governmental restrictions on 
speech, Nyabwa has not stated a cause of action against FaceBook.”); Shulman v. 
Facebook.com, No. CV 17-764 (JMV), 2017 WL 5129885, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 
2017) (“The Court also notes that efforts to apply the First Amendment to 
Facebook . . . have consistently failed.”); Forbes v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16 CV 404 
(AMD), 2016 WL 676396, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016) (“Facebook is a private 
corporation, and Mr. Forbes does not allege any facts that could support a claim of 
a ‘close nexus’ between Facebook and the state, such that Facebook’s actions (or 
inaction) may be fairly attributable to the state.”); Doe v. Cuomo, No. 10-CV-1534 
(TJM/CFH), 2013 WL 1213174, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) (Facebook not 
state actor under joint action test); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-
2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (concluding 
Google was not state actor); see also, e.g., Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 
F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (“AOL is a private, for profit company and is not 
subject to constitutional free speech guarantees. . . .  We are unpersuaded by 
Green’s contentions that AOL is transformed into a state actor because AOL 
provides a connection to the Internet on which government and taxpayer-funded 
websites are found, and because AOL opens its network to the public whenever an 
AOL member accesses the Internet and receives email or other messages from 
non-members of AOL.”); Howard v. America Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (concluding that AOL was not a state actor where plaintiffs had argued 
that “AOL is a ‘quasi-public utility’ that ‘involv[es] a public trust’”). 
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As an initial matter, private social media platforms like Twitter do not 
operate pursuant to government control.  The government has no involvement in 
Twitter’s product design, hiring, advertising sales, raising money, or any of its 
other basic corporate functions.  And most relevant here, Twitter enforces its 
Terms of Service independent of the government.  Accordingly, there can be no 
legitimate claim that the government “exercises ‘coercive power,’ is ‘entwined in 
[the] management or control’ of [Twitter], or provides [Twitter] with ‘significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert,’” nor is there any reasonable argument that 
Twitter “‘operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its 
agents.’”  Cranley v. National Life Ins. Co. of Vermont, 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296).10   
Nor can courts reasonably conclude that Twitter can be treated as a state 
actor under the “public function” test.  Under this test, “‘[s]tate action may be 
found in situations where an activity that traditionally has been the exclusive, or 
near exclusive, function of the State has been contracted out to a private entity.’” 
                                           
10 To be sure, determining whether a private entity is a state actor is a 
“necessarily fact-bound inquiry.”  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 
(1982).  But in the social media and Internet context, there is no indication of any 
“‘interdependence,’ ‘symbiosis,’ or ‘nexus’” with the government.  Jensen v. 
Farrell Lines, Inc., 625 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).  Absent that kind of 
government connection or control, no court can reasonably conclude that social 
media platforms like Twitter are state actors under the government control prong 
of the “state action” test. 
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Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259, 264-65 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 
2004)).  As the Supreme Court has cautioned, however, “[w]hile many functions 
have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 
“exclusively reserved to the State.”  Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 
(1978).  “[C]ourts have found state action when private parties perform such 
sovereign functions as medical care for prison inmates; holding local primary 
elections; animal control; operation of a post office; and . . . fire protection.”  
Grogan, 768 F.3d at 265 (internal citations omitted).  Internet platforms like 
Twitter do not serve anything remotely comparable to these public functions.    
Nevertheless, some have tried to argue that social media websites satisfy the 
“public function” test because they hold out their private property as spaces for 
open public discourse.  See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-
LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (“Plaintiff emphasizes 
that Defendants hold YouTube out ‘as a public forum dedicated to freedom of 
expression to all’ and argues that ‘a private property owner who operates its 
property as a public forum for speech is subject to judicial scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.’” (quoting Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 
18, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 5:17-cv-06064-LHK (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 
2018), ECF No. 33)).  These plaintiffs have attempted to support their novel theory 
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with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), 
and Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).  In Marsh, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment prohibited a private “company 
town” from imposing criminal punishment on individuals distributing religious 
literature.  In so doing, the Court loosely stated that the “more an owner, for his 
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his 
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who 
use it.”  Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.  Seventy years later, Packingham described social 
media sites as “the modern public square” because they provide a space for “users 
to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any 
subject that might come to mind.”  Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.  Based on 
these two decisions, some have asserted that social media platforms are modern-
day “company towns” and therefore must comply with First Amendment strictures 
like the town in Marsh.   
This argument finds no support in precedent, and it has, unsurprisingly, been 
soundly rejected.  E.g., Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *5-8.  A series of post-
Marsh Supreme Court opinions limited that case to its facts, explaining that private 
property can “be treated as though it were public” only where “that property has 
taken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., ‘residential buildings, streets, a system of 
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a ‘business block’ on which business places 
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are situated.’”  Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emp. 
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., 
dissenting)); Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (noting that Supreme Court’s 
post-Marsh decisions clarified that it “‘was never intended to apply’ outside ‘the 
very special situation of a company-owned town’” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551, 562-63 (1972)).  Social media sites offer their users a wide array of 
functions, but they are a long way from “tak[ing] on all the attributes” of a 
municipality.  Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added). 
And, for all of Packingham’s broad language, it “did not, and had no 
occasion to, address whether private social media corporations like [Twitter] are 
state actors that must regulate the content of their websites according to the 
strictures of the First Amendment.”  Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *8; see 
also Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting 
agreement with Court’s holding but explaining that “I cannot join the opinion of 
the Court . . . because of its undisciplined dicta”).  Instead, the issue before the 
Court was whether a North Carolina law violated the First Amendment because it 
prohibited sex offenders from all forms of social media.  Thus, the critical feature 
of Packingham is that it involved a State taking action that the First Amendment 
barred.  Packingham in no way suggested that the First Amendment barred a 
private entity like Twitter from limiting or completely prohibiting an individual’s 
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use of its platform.  Put simply, Packingham did not hold that private Internet 
companies were subject to First Amendment scrutiny as state actors, or that those 
private Internet companies could not prevent users from accessing their websites.  
E.g., Nyabwa v. FaceBook, No. 2:17-CV-24, 2018 WL 585467, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 26, 2018) (“Although the Court recognized in Packingham . . . that social 
media sites like Facebook and Twitter have become the equivalent of a public 
forum for sharing ideas and commentary, the Court did not declare a cause of 
action against a private entity such as Facebook for a violation of the free speech 
rights protected by the First Amendment.”). 
In sum, for all of their control over their own property, social media 
platforms are not state actors for First Amendment purposes.  Nor are they state 
actors because they play a vital role in modern public discourse.  Even if this Court 
finds that certain pockets of Twitter are public forums, and even if this Court finds 
that government actors who operate Twitter accounts are restrained by the First 
Amendment, it should make clear that Twitter itself is not similarly restrained.11 
                                           
11 Like the district court below, the Internet Association assumes that “‘it is 
substantially likely that the President and other executive . . . officials would abide 
by an authoritative interpretation of [a] . . . constitutional provision.’”  Knight First 
Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 579 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 
505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992)).  As such, it need not opine on the proper remedy in this 
case.  That said, it is important to emphasize that, if this Court were to conclude 
that President Trump violated the First Amendment by blocking the individual 
plaintiffs from the “interactive space” on his Twitter account, it could not order 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should carefully limit its opinion to the 
unique facts of this case and expressly make clear that:  (1) only a small portion of 
Twitter is even arguably a public forum; (2) Twitter retains control over its private 
property under the terms of its User Agreement and can remove users or block 
content in its own discretion; and (3) when taking such actions, Twitter is not 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it is not a state actor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Date: August 14, 2018   /s/ Chad I. Golder    
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. 
Chad I. Golder 
Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler 
MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 
1155 F Street N.W., 7th Floor 
Washington, D.C.  20004-1361 
Telephone:  (202) 220-1100 
Donald.Verrilli@mto.com 
Chad.Golder@mto.com 
Rachel.Miller-Ziegler@mto.com 
 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
 
 
 
                                           
Twitter to unblock the individual plaintiffs as a means of effectuating that 
constitutional decision.  See, e.g., Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018). 
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